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Partial Manifestations
Nick Kroll
There has been a movement, growing over the last twenty years, to
treat dispositionality as irreducible and, in turn, o￿er dispositional ac-
counts of important metaphysical matters such as causation, the laws
of nature, and modality. However, unlike the earlier turn towards pos-
sible worlds in metaphysics, the turn towards dispositions hasn’t had
much impact in semantics. But this is largely because semanticists
have yet to consider what dispositional analyses of (say) tense, aspect,
conditionals, generics, or modals would look like. My aim in this paper
is to push the movement forward on both the metaphysics and seman-
tics front by taking the ￿rst steps towards a dispositional account of
events in progress (the metaphysics front) and the progressive aspect
(the semantics front).
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1 Introduction
Bad news. You just ingested some poison. Worse news. The poison is lethal: it is disposed to kill
those whose ingest it. And the poison’s disposition is manifesting. You are sweating, nauseous,
and feel the end approaching quickly.
Good news. I have the antidote. Better news. I administer it and save your life.
The antidote prevented the manifestation of the poison’s disposition. Sure enough, the
poison was killing you. But it didn’t kill you–thanks to the antidote.
In the literature on dispositions, something that prevents a disposition from either partially
or fully manifesting (without taking away the disposition) is called a mask, and a disposition
is said to be masked when a mask does its job. So, the antidote is an example of a mask, and it
masks the poison’s disposition to kill.1
This case is also an example of something those working on the semantics of the progres-
sive aspect are familiar with: the imperfective paradox. The imperfective paradox is simply the
observation that an event in progress need not culminate, and so the inference from a past pro-
gressive to its perfective correlate is not, in general, a valid inference.2 The past progressive The
poison was killing you is true but its perfective correlate The poison killed you is false.
And so we might wonder:
• When events in progress fail to culminate, is it always in virtue of something interfering
the manifestation of a disposition?
Further re￿ection might give rise to the more general question:
• Are events in progress simply partial manifestations of dispositions?
For helpful comments and discussion, I’d like to thank Bennett Helm, Glenn Ross, and participants of the
Workshop on the Morphological, Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Dispositions at University of Stuttgart.
1The poison example is due to Bird 1998. Masks owe their name to Johnston 1992.
2Dowty 1977 was the ￿rst to stress the importance of the imperfective paradox in the semantics of the progres-
sive. He also coined the phrase.
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Let’s suppose the answer is “Yes” to our more general question. Should semanticists work-
ing on the progressive care? Probably not that much if orthodoxy is correct. According to or-
thodoxy, both dispositions and progressives are to be analyzed in terms of possible worlds and
so a tight connection between the progressive and dispositions might be somewhat interesting
but overall not much of a surprise.3
Many theorists, however, have started to take seriously the view that dispositionality is
irreducible.4 If this view is correct, then semanticists working on the progressive should care
about whether events in progress are just partial manifestations of dispositions. For if events in
progress are just partial manifestations of dispositions and dispositionality is irreducible, one
would hope for, and expect, a dispositional analysis of the progressive.
Now I’m going to just assume that the view that dispositionality is irreducible should be
taken seriously. My primary goal, then, is to get you to hope for, and expect, a dispositional
analysis of the progressive by arguing that an account of events in progress as partial manifes-
tations of dispositions is plausible and worth taking seriously. My secondary goal is take some
steps toward satisfying your newfound desire for a dispositional analysis of the progressive. In
short, my aim is to make some progress towards a dispositional account of events in progress
and the progressive aspect.
2 Events in progress
Let’s start with an initial attempt at an account of events in progress as partial manifestations
of dispositions.
(1) Necessarily, e is a   event in progress at t i￿ e is, at t , disposed to become a   event and
this disposition is activated at t .
There are two features of this account of events in progress that immediately stand out. First, it
ascribes dispositions to events. Second, it appeals to the notion of a disposition being activated.
First things ￿rst. Dispositions are usually taken to be properties of objects. Certainly, the
standard philosophical examples of dispositions (fragility, solubility, irascibility, etc.) are prop-
erties of objects. So, it might seem a bit odd to think of events as having dispositions. Some
might even claim that it is a category mistake to ascribe dispositions to events.
However, if we think of dispositionality as a special sort of potentiality, then there shouldn’t
be a problem with ascribing dispositions to events.5 Consider a well-worn example for the lit-
erature on the progressive. Suppose Mary went for a walk and in doing so partially crossed
the street only to be run over by a bus.6 Now Mary’s walk has variety of properties. And one
property it has, during a certain stretch of time anyways, is the property of being a crossing the
street event in progress. And this property is one that involves potentiality. Indeed it seems to
involve partially actualized potentially. To put it another way, if e is an event of Mary crossing
the street in progress, then e has the potential to become an event in which Mary crosses the
3See Asher 1992, Bonomi 1997, Dowty 1979, Higginbotham 2009, Landman 1992, and Portner 1998 for a sampling
of the orthodoxy concerning the progressive. See Choi 2008, Goodman 1954, Lewis 1997, Manley and Wasserman
2008, and Steinberg 2009 for a sampling of the orthodoxy concerning dispositions.
4See Bird 2007 , Ellis and Lierse 1994, Molnar 2003, Mumford 1998, and Vetter 2015 for a sampling.
5Thinking of dispositionality as a special sort of potentially doesn’t imply a reduction of dispositionality any
more than thinking of knowledge as a special sort mental state implies a reduction of knowledge (which it doesn’t).
Also, see Vetter 2015 for a reduction of modality to potentiality.
6This example, I believe, begins with Dowty 1979.
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street, a potentiality which has been partially actualized. This should be relatively uncontro-
versial. But if it is, then it shouldn’t be controversial to think of events as having dispositions:
Mary’s walk, for a certain stretch of time, has the property of being disposed to become one in
which she crosses the street.
But one might object that I’m moving too quickly. Potentiality, after all, doesn’t imply
dispositionality. A coin may have the potential to land heads without being disposed to land
heads. So, I shouldn’t be moving so quickly from an event having a certain potentiality to an
event having a certain disposition.
Well, take the coin. It is disposed to land heads or tails even though it is not disposed to
land heads or disposed to land tails. But for any coin, if it has the potential to land heads or
tails, then it must be that either the coin has the potential to lands or the coin has the potential
to land tails. In general, if x is disposed to F or G, then it doesn’t follow that x is disposed to F
or disposed toG; but if x has the potential to F orG, then it does follow that x has the potential
to F or the potential to G. This is one of the ways in which dispositionality is a special kind of
potentiality.
But Bonomi’s multiple choice paradox shows that events bear this mark of dispositionality.
Here’s Bonomi’s illustration of the paradox.7 Suppose Leo has decided to drive to Paris or Metz
and is using the ￿rst part of his drive, the part before the road forks, to make his ￿nal decision.
Then, during the ￿rst part of his drive, Leo is driving to Paris or Metz even though he’s not
driving to Paris or driving to Metz. Thus, we also ￿nd an important mark of dispositionality
in the case of events in progress. I conclude, then, that it isn’t some kind of category mistake
to ascribe dispositions to events. In Bonomi’s example, we have an event that is disposed (at
a certain time t ) to become a Leo drives to Paris or Metz event even though this event isn’t
disposed (at t ) to become a Leo drives to Paris event or disposed (at t ) to become a Leo drives
to Metz event.
Let’s now turn the other feature of (1) that immediately stands out: the notion of a dispo-
sition being activated. Some salt is stored in a jar. It’s taken out, placed in water, and dissolves.
When the salt was in the jar, its disposition to dissolve was dormant. When it was placed in
water, its disposition to dissolve was activated. And this is all that is meant by “activated”: a
disposition is activated just in case it isn’t dormant.
A further clari￿cation might be necessary to avoid a possible misunderstanding. It is often
assumed that any given disposition is associated with a manifestation type and a stimulus con-
dition. So, for example, solubility is associated with the dissolving, its manifestation type, and
being submerged in water, its stimulus condition. Following Vetter 2015, I’m skeptical of the
claim that a disposition must have a stimulus condition. But let’s put that aside. The important
point is that one shouldn’t assume that a disposition is activated whenever its stimulus con-
dition obtains. Some salt can be submerged in water without its disposition to dissolve being
activated. Just suppose it is encased in plastic. The stimulus condition for the salt’s disposition
to dissolve obtains. But the plastic prevents the disposition from being activated. Generalizing,
a mask can prevent a disposition from manifesting even though it is activated (e.g., the poison
case). And it can prevent a disposition from manifesting by preventing it from being activated
in the ￿rst place (e.g., the salt case). Let’s now see why we need the activation condition in (1).
We need the condition that the disposition be activated because it seems possible for an
7Bonomi 1997 o￿ers more than one illustration of the paradox. The example that follows involves an agent. But
Bonomi o￿ers another example without agents to show that the paradox doesn’t crucially involve agency.
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event to be disposed to become a   event even though this disposition is dormant. I’m not sure
if I have a completely convincing example of such a scenario. But here’s a try.
Suppose you need your computer to run a large number of tasking processes. However,
you know that the computer is disposed to overheat when it runs such processes. So you take
extreme measures: you rent a commercial air-conditioner and set it at its lowest setting. You
are now freezing but at least the the computer can do its work. Suppose it does. It seems to me
that this event of the computer running such and such processes is an event disposed to become
one in which the computer overheats. However, the air-conditioner masks this disposition: it
prevents the disposition from being activated in the ￿rst place and so prevents even a partial
manifestation of the disposition.
As I said, I’m not sure if this is a completely convincing example. Thinking about it, how-
ever, convinces me that it should be possible to come up with a completely convincing example.
But if I wrong, we could drop the activation condition on the grounds that whenever an event
is disposed to become a   event, this disposition is activated.
In any case, it is time to address the problemwith (1). To state the problem, we need to brie￿y
describe a distinction made in the study of lexical aspect. This is the distinction between telic
and atelic verb phrases (VPs). The distinction is sometimes characterized in terms of culmination
or temporal boundedness. Simplifying somewhat, the idea is this. Take a simple sentence in the
simple past. If the sentence describes a situation as one that involves a culmination/temporal
bound, then its (unin￿ected) VP is telic. Otherwise, its VP is atelic. For example, Willa built
a house describes a situation as one that involves a culmination/temporal bound: namely, the
point at which Willa ￿nshes building the house. So, the VP build a house is telic. On the other
hand, Mirah walked doesn’t describe a situation as one that involves a culmination/temporal
bound.8 So, the VP walk is atelic. Another feature of atelic VPs is that they, unlike telic VPs, are
homogeneous in the sense that if   is a sentence with an atelic VP and   is true of a su￿ciently
extended situation s , then s can be divided in sub-situations (with no remainder) such that   is
true of each these sub-situations. In short, if Mirah walked is true of an su￿ciently extended
event, then that event can be divided into smaller events such thatMirah walked is true of each
of the smaller events. This is not the case withWilla built a house or any other sentence with a
telic VP.9
To extend the telic/atelic distinction event types, we can say that   is a telic event type just
in case what it is to be a   event involves having a culmination/temporal bound; otherwise  
is an atelic event type.
Now for the problem with (1). I’ve been careful with the examples I used in clarifying (1).
Each example has been a telic event in progress. But consider an atelic event in progress like
one of Mirah walking. There is something odd saying that such an event is disposed to become
a Mirah walks event. What’s odd is that any su￿ciently extended event in progress of Mirah
walking is already a Mirah walks event. So how can it be disposed to become one if it is already
one?
In previous work, I appealed to resultant states to get around a similar issue.10 I’ll do the
same here. A resultant state is a state of an event having taken place. So, if Willa built a house,
8Of course, the VP walk could be true of an event that has a culmination. For example, if an event of Willa
walking to the store is one that has a culmination, and walk would be true of such an event. But walk doesn’t
describe the event as involving a culmination.
9See Rothstein 2004 for a much richer overview and discussion of telecity.
10See Kroll 2015.
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then there is a state ofWilla having built a house. Such a state is a resultant state of the respective
Willa builds a house event. Likewise if Mirah walked, then there is a state of Mirah having
walked. Such a state is a resultant state of the respective Mirah walks event.11
To see how resultant states help, observe that a su￿ciently extended Mirah walks event is
made up of other Mirah walks events, each of which has a corresponding resultant state. For
example, suppose Mirah walked from point A to point D. Then there is, among others, a Mirah
walks event that begins at point A and stops at point B and another one that stops at point C.
The one that stops at point C is temporally larger than the one that stop at B. So, the resultant
state of the one the stops at point C is a resultant state of a Mirah walks event that is larger
than the one that ends at point B.
Here’s the idea then: at any time during Mirah’s walk, the event is disposed to bring about
a resultant state of a “larger” Mirah walks event. More formally:
• e is a Mirah walks event in progress at t i￿ (i) e is, at t , disposed to bring about a resultant
state of a Mirah walks event at some t 0 > t , and (ii) this disposition is activated at t .
It follows from this proposal that an event in progress of Mirah walking brings about resultant
states of ever (temporally) larger Mirah walks events. So, we have a nice way capturing the
“progress” of such an event in progress.
Generalizing from this treatment of Mirah’s walk, we get a dispositional account of events
in progress that covers both atelic and telic events in progress.
(2) Necessarily, e is a  event in progress at t i￿ (i) e is, at t , disposed to bring about a resultant
state of   event at some t 0 > t , and (ii) this disposition is activated at t .
To see how this proposal handles telic events in progress, note that when   is replaced by a
telic event type, the manifestation of such a disposition would be the culmination of the event
in progress and so the manifestation would not only amount to the event becoming a   event
but also serve a temporal bound for the event in progress.
We have, then, a dispositional account of events in progress that covers both telic and atelic
events in progress. While I haven’t o￿ered a thoroughgoing argument for this account of events
in progress, I hope to have made a fairly convincing case that the account is plausible and worth
taking seriously. So, given our earlier assumption that irreducible dispositionality is a position
worth taking seriously, you should suddenly ￿nd yourself with a desire for a dispositional anal-
ysis of the progressive aspect.
3 The progressive
Here’s the analysis one gets from the above account of events in progress. Let   be a variable
over base clauses (i.e., simple sentences stripped of tense and aspect) that denote event types.
And let [[ ]] =  . Then:
(3) Necessarily, Prog[ ] is true at t i￿ there is an event e such that e is, at t , disposed to bring
about a resultant state of a   event at some t 0 > t , and (ii) this disposition is activated at
t .
11Resultant states might seem like “ghostly” entities. Maybe they are. But that’s not a serious objection to their
existence. In any case, Parsons 1990 was the ￿rst to bring resultant states to light. Since then they have been put to
a variety of uses in semantics and metaphysics. See Parsons 1990, Szabo 2006, and Zimmerman 2011.
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(3) predicts thatMary is crossing the street is true i￿ there is an event with an activated disposi-
tion to bring about (at some later time) a state of Mary having crossed the street. And it predicts
that Maeva is dancing is true i￿ there is an event with an activated disposition to bring about
(at some later time) a state of Maeva having danced.
Let me stress again that we are working under the assumption that dispositionality is ir-
reducible and so not to be given a modal analysis. We are also working under the assumption
that events in progress are to be understood as partial manifestations of dispositions. Given
these two assumptions, I’m not going to argue for (3) by comparing it to the orthodox modal
analyses of the progressive. This is because, given the two assumptions, modal analyses of the
progressive are already o￿ the table.
I will, however, argue for (3) by highlighting some virtues of the analysis of the progressive.
First, the analysis o￿ers an explanation of the imperfective paradox. Simplifying matters,
an event can have an activated disposition to become a   event without ever becoming a  
event. So, the inference from a progressive to its perfective correlate will not, in general, be
valid.
Second, the analysis o￿ers an explanation of the multiple-choice paradox. As was already
mentioned, an event can be disposed to become a Leo drive to Paris or Metz event without being
disposed to become a Leo drive to Paris event or a Leo drive to Metz event. So, the analysis
predicts that Leo was driving to Paris or Metz does not entail either Leo was driving to Paris or
Leo was driving to Metz.
Third, the analysis o￿ers an explanation of the apparent opacity of the progressive. Just
as Sven, when pumpkin picking, can be disposed to pick a large pumpkin even though there is
no particular large pumpkin such that Sven is disposed to pick it, an event can be disposed to
become one in which Sven picks a pumpkin even though there is no particular pumpkin such
that the event is disposed to become one in which Sven picks that pumpkin. So, (3) can account
for the (default) reading of Sven is picking a pumpkin under which the sentence does not entail
that there is a pumpkin such that Sven is picking it.12
Lastly, the analysis provides substance to the main rival to possible world analyses of the
progressive: partitive analyses. The most interesting partitive analysis is the partial realization
analysis considered, but not endorsed, in Landman 1992 . The basic idea of the analysis is that
Prog[ ] is true i￿ there is an event that partially realizes the event type  . The main problem
with this analysis is that it gives rise to the question: just what is it for an event to partially
realize an event type? Sure enough, one could analyze partial realization in terms of possible
worlds: roughly, e partially realizes   i￿ e would fully realize   if it were to continue without
interruption. But then the partial realization analysis collapses into a modal analysis of the
progressive. (3), however, is a non-modal analysis of the progressive that provides the right
kind of answer: for an event to partially realize an event type   is for the disposition of the
event to become a   event to be partially manifested. In other words, partial realization is to be
understood as partial manifestation.
In closing, let me brie￿y say why I take this last virtue to be the most interesting virtue of
the analysis.
12The pumpkin picking example is found in Stechow 1999, who credits the example to Angelika Kratzer.
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4 Concluding remarks
The movement to treat dispositionality as irreducible and, in turn, o￿er dispositional accounts
of important metaphysical matters (such as causation, the laws of nature, and modality) hasn’t
had much impact in semantics. But this, it seems to me, is largely because semanticists have
yet to seriously consider what dispositional analyses of tense, aspect, conditionals, generics,
modals, and so on would look like. Now (3) might only be the ￿rst step towards a proper dis-
positional analysis of the progressive. Nonetheless, it allows us to appreciate partitive analyses
of the progressive in a new and interesting light. Indeed, it strikes me that (3) serves the most
substantive and illuminating partitive analysis of the progressive to date. Thus, the analysis
serves not only as a ￿rst step towards a dispositional analysis of the progressive but also as a
motivation to develop dispositional analyses in other areas of semantics.
In any case, with (2) and (3), I hope to have made some progress towards a dispositional
account of event in progress and the progressive; and, in doing so, pushed the dispositionalism
movement forward on both the metaphysics front and the semantics front.
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